This paper studies optimal forest policies in an overlapping generations forest economy with one-sided altruism and public goods, where timber and monetary bequests can be made across generations. We extend the existing economics literature by demonstrating that timber bequests can dominate money bequests in many situations, and that timber bequests may even be operative in dynamically inefficient steady states. We also characterize the optimal policy mix which maximizes long run social welfare. This policy mix depends on the nature of the steady state equilibrium, and whether non-landowners have full access to forest stocks to enjoy amenities. The results support the argument that bequests and forest stocks must be considered jointly in determining first best and second best policies. Although these are often analyzed in isolation, we show that combinations of taxes and subsidies on harvesting and bequests may be efficient in a range of equilibria. The optimal policy mix we characterize in several types of steady states is not consistent with the choice governments typically make in practice.
Introduction
Forest markets and forest stocks are linked through time due to landowners whose generations overlap. The traditional approach to long run forestry is the well-known Faustmann model and its variants. Although these are based on series of infinite rotations, they do not make explicit the preferences of generations over time for intergenerational transfers. But these issues are important to forests. The value of forest stocks are transferred from generation to generation either by timber bequests or by sales.
In an economy with strong altruistic bequest motives, the time path of forest stocks will depend on bequests made from current generations to the next. The form of timber bequests is unlike other transferable forms of capital, like money, because forest stocks can jointly provide future harvest revenues and amenity services. Thus, standing forest stock serves a dual purpose when bequeathed, allowing for both private consumption and public goods.
Previous (non-resource) analyses of overlapping generations economies with altruistic bequest motives have established that, for an economy at the golden rule (defined as the equality between real interest rates and population growth), a market solution corresponds to the socially optimal one (see e.g. Blanchard and Fisher 1988) .
Moreover, despite one-sided altruism from parents to children, money bequests from the current generation to the next one are never operative in dynamically inefficient economies (i.e., an economy not satisfying the golden rule condition) (see e.g. Weil 1987 ). However, these approaches assume that bequests always take the form of money.
Unlike timber, money serves only a single purpose, consumption. Given the dual purpose of forests, one important question to ask beyond the economics literature is whether an overlapping generations forest economy can ever produce operative timber bequests with one-sided altruism.
Another important question concerns government policy design. If a forest economy does not reside at the golden rule, there is scope for government intervention to shift the economy towards it, thereby achieving the first best level of forest capital and public goods. Usually, governments have at their disposal a variety of instruments for this purpose, like taxes and subsidies, which are used throughout the world to promote long term use of forests. Governments also face constraints that prevent implementing policies to attain the first best equilibrium. By and large the most important constraint is revenue pressure, resulting from the fact that most governments fund activities through revenue collections. The most common policy mix used to collect revenues in the forest sector is a tax on both harvesting and bequests.
There is one distinguishing feature of forest policy, important to government intervention, that is not addressed in the economics literature. Within each generation (both old and young) there are individuals who do not own forests but still can obtain amenity services from them. The nature of these amenities depends on access to the resource. If these citizens, who are not landowners, do not have access to private forests, then any value to the unharvested stock is strictly a private good. Conversely, if nonlandowner citizens have free access to private forests, then amenity services represent pure public goods. Whether or not amenities are private or public should influence government policy choice, if governments indeed care about these amenities.
There is some work that focuses on policy choice problems in economies with forests and, specifically, with bequests in the form of physical timber stocks. A few papers address timber bequest motives in overlapping generations economies (Amacher et. al 1999 , Lofgren 1992 , Hultkrantz 1986 ). However, this work has not addressed the choice between timber or money bequests, and more importantly, it has not addressed the realistic case where resources can be transferred across generations as either timber or money. More importantly, it has not addressed the design of policies to achieve efficient long run forest stocks, and amenities of both a private and public nature have not been considered. Recent work that examines tax policies derived in the presence of government revenue pressures have not allowed for linkages across generations through bequests (i.e., Brazee 1997, Koskela and Ollikainen 1997) . Thus, this body of work is not useful for understanding long run efficiency or defining policies used to achieve efficiency in forest sectors.
Our purpose in this paper is to study optimal forest policy instruments when timber bequests are operative and governments face revenue pressures. Given the importance of amenity services for forest stocks, we allow for the possibility that citizens may have access to private forests to enjoy amenities, so that harvesting imposes a negative externality upon them. We also examine policy choices for two types of governments, one that tries only to achieve a certain revenue target, and one that is rent seeking and attempts to maximize revenue collections. The ultimate goal is to determine whether the common practice of taxing both timber harvests and bequests is efficient in the long run. We show that, depending on the nature of equilibria and amenity services, the optimal policy consists of a mix of taxes and subsidies when timber bequests are present.
Our results provide answers to three questions vital in the current forest policy debate. First, although much has been argued for nondistortionary lump sum instruments, can these indeed allow the economy to achieve either first best or second best outcomes? Second, given that governments throughout much of the world tax both harvests and bequests, is this the efficient policy mix in various steady states of the forest sector; that is, does this encourage the right level of long run forest stocks? And, third, what is the most efficient policy mix for governments that, as is often the case, face constraints on behavior or preferences; a related question is how these constraints impact the realization of forest stocks and public goods for future generations? The answers to these questions will be important to the ongoing debate about using government intervention to achieve long run sustainability of forest stocks and public goods in economies with forests.
We proceed as follows. In section 2 we construct a basic overlapping model of a representative agent where both money and timber can be transferred across generations.
This model is then used to examine government policy choice problems in Sections 3 and 4. Section 3 examines optimal policies both cases when amenity services provided by forests are private goods only, and when amenity services are also public goods. We also examine incentives for the government to choose policies when it seeks to maximize revenue collections. Section 4 extends the analysis to a small open economy with a production sector existing in equilibrium with the forest sector. Finally, there is a brief concluding section.
Forest and Money Bequests in an Overlapping Generations Economy

Basic Set-Up
Consider an overlapping generations forest economy where individual landowners live two periods. In period t the landowner is a member of the first generation and in period t+1 s/he is a member of the second generation. Landowners maximize the following utility function,
which is additively separable and strictly concave in its arguments, which are current and future consumption t c 1 and t c 2 , and current and future flow of amenity services from standing timber stocks k 1t and k 2t valued through the v(.) function . The time preference for personal utility is ϒ. V t+1 is the indirect utility of the representative landowner in the next generation, based on the corresponding utility function U t+1 , and ∼ is an intergenerational discount factor which measures the strength of the bequest motive, 1 0 Ψ Ψ ∼ . The utility function assumes one-sided altruism, that is, the current generation landowner can bequest to future generations, but "young" landowners do not bequest to old landowners. The landowner can harvest each period and obtain consumption while they are young or old. They can save while young and obtain higher future consumption at the market interest rate, and when they are old they may leave a timber or money bequest to the next generation. With this in mind, consumption, harvesting, and the forest stock are defined through the following equations of motion over two periods of life for the representative landowner in each generation.
where r t+1 is the market interest rate in time period t+1 and R t+1 = 1+r t+1 . Timber bequests made from the previous generation (who are old at time t) are represented by b t , while the bequest of unharvested timber made from the representative landowner (who is old at time t+1) to the landowner born at time t+1 is given by b t+1 . Similarly, monetary bequests derived from selling land or timber are defined using m t and m t+1 in (2) and (3), and n is the population growth rate. We follow the economics literature and assume that the landowner works only when young, receiving wage income from inelastically supplying one unit of labor, and retires when old as a member of the second generation.
We also assume for convenience that the representative landowner has a rate of time preference equal to the market interest rate. ≥ respectively, and a distortionary instrument targeting forest harvesting, x ≥ . We do not restrict the signs of these policies; a nonnegative instrument represents a tax and a nonpositive instrument represents a subsidy. All policies are assumed to be constant over time.
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Prices for timber harvested are given by p t and p t+1 in periods t and t+1. In (2) and (3) we make use of net prices,
rates of harvesting in the first and second periods for the current generation landowner,
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The assumption of an exogenous interest rate and landowners who are interest rate-takers makes sense in practice. Typically, the value of forest capital is comparatively small relative to the total value of capital in other sectors of the economy. This is used for notational simplicity. Since we focus later on the steady state equilibrium, where all time-indexed parameters are constant, it would not matter how tax policies are presented in the model. In fact, the assumption of constant policies is probably more the rule than the exception in practice. Governments would face great resistance if they attempted to adjust policies regularly, either because of administrative costs or the political process which determines tax rates in most countries. Thus, the assumption of constant policies is probably a reasonable one.
respectively. Unharvested forest stock increases between periods according to a concave growth function, g(.) in (4).
Finally, equations (5) and (6) define the unharvested forest stocks, which provide nontimber amenities described by the strictly concave valuation functions ) ( 1t k v and
. These are equivalent to the state equations governing changes in the forest stock over time for each representative generation. Note that there is a timing assumption implicit in the presentation of these equations of motion. All activities in equations (5) and (6) are assumed to take place in the beginning of the periods. Thus, in the beginning of the first period, the landowner harvests from a stock, b t , that was bequeathed to him/her from the last generation (eqn 5). The landowner lets the remaining stock, defined by what is harvested, grow into the second period, i.e., k 1t = b t -x 1t . In the beginning of the second period, the landowner decides how much to harvest in that period and how much to give as a bequest to heirs. Hence, his ending stock (at then end of the landowner's life) is equal to (1+n)b t+1 (this can be shown by substituting equation (4) into (6)). 
Operative Bequest Motives
The representative landowner chooses saving, harvesting, money and timber bequests so as to maximize (1) subject to (2) -(6). Assuming that saving and harvesting are at an interior solution yields the following first-order conditions
Naturally, the next generation harvests a part of k 2t ; this harvest is defined as x 1t+1 . Therefore, the forest stock that exists at the end of the second period is actually, k 2t+1 = (1+n)(b t+1 -x 1t+1 ). In our dynasty model the current generation takes into account the harvesting by the young in the steady state, so that we can concentrate on that generations' decisions only.
Equation (7a) is the optimal savings condition, which states that landowners save so as to equate marginal utilities of consumption across periods. Equation (7b) is the optimal harvest condition for period t. Using equation (7a) this can be re-expressed as the following harvesting rule:
Hence, harvesting in period t is undertaken up to the point where the difference between the marginal revenue and opportunity costs of harvesting equals the marginal rate of substitution between amenities and consumption. Equation (7c) describes the optimal timber bequest left by a landowner who is a member of the second generation in period t+1. The marginal costs of leaving a bequest equal the lost consumption, and this is equated to the marginal benefits in terms of amenities to the landowner and future consumption and amenities accruing to future generations who inherit the bequest. Finally, equation (7d) describes the landowner's optimal money bequest. The landowner leaves this bequest so that the marginal benefit in terms of future consumption for the next generation equals the marginal cost in terms of forgone consumption for the landowner.
We follow the usual practice from the literature in this field and assume that the first-order conditions define a unique steady state equilibrium; we then can examine the conditions for operative (i.e., positive) bequests.
Bequest Motives in the Absence of Policies
The condition for operative money bequests, derived from the first-order condition (7d) without taxes, is,
In what follows the derivatives are noted by primes for functions with one argument and the partial derivative by subscripts for functions with many arguments. Hence, e.g.
where 1 0 Ψ Ψ ∼ (see Appendix 1 for the derivation of equations (8) and (9)). Equation (8) implies money bequests are zero when the steady state is dynamically inefficient, i.e., when n r Ψ .
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The condition for operative steady state timber stock bequests without taxes can be shown to equal,
where
, and where the variables with a "^" refer to steadystate values in the absence of money and timber bequests.
In order to compare the condition for operative timber bequests with the one for money bequests, we consider now how (8) compares with (9). Using the natural
. Hence, the timber bequest condition can be re-written as
. We can further simplify the term A in the RHS denominator of (9) using the interior solution for harvesting (7b),
Hence the additional term in (9) relative to (8) is less that one, i.e.,
Therefore, comparing (8) and (9) reveals that timber bequests will dominate money bequests in the absence of taxes. Intuitively, if there is no penalty for bequests and amenities are present, then there is no incentive for the landowner to convert timber to money (through harvesting) prior to leaving a bequest. Given equation (10), it is also evident from (9) that the condition for operative timber bequests may be satisfied even in a dynamically efficient economy where r > n. Most importantly, because of (10) Proposition 1 is a new result in the overlapping generations literature on bequests, and it has implications here for a government wishing to achieve the first best outcome.
The economics literature demonstrates that money bequests are operative only in dynamically efficient economies, while money gifts are operative in dynamically inefficient economies. We have shown timber bequests, however, can be operative and dominant in many equilibria, as long as there is one-sided altruism where parents transfer resources to children. This comes from the fact that forests are a special form of capital.
Besides harvestable timber, forests provide amenity services, and these represent an additional benefit of giving and receiving timber bequests. For example, in the money bequest condition (eqn. 8) the landowner equates lost marginal utility of consumption due to the bequest with marginal utility of increased consumption of the next generation.
With timber bequests (eqn. 9) , the bequeathed forest stock also provides amenity services to the old generation as well as the next generation, thus lowering the net loss in marginal utility from a bequest. Hence, in the case of forests, the bequest results in a smaller net loss in marginal utility and a higher utility of receiving bequest than in the case of money bequests.
Bequests Motives in the Presence of Policies
Proposition 1 was derived assuming an absence of any policies. Next we consider this result in the presence of policies. We will show that the threshold level of altruism depends on the tax structure, and "excessive" taxation may lead to elimination of bequest-motivated transfers .
The operative timber bequest condition in the presence of taxes can be expressed
Using the same procedure as above, we can show that 1 ] ) (
hold at an interior solution. Therefore, if it is also true that
, then we have a sufficient condition for the timber bequest motive to be reinforced, relative to the money bequest motive, in the presence of policies (compare (9') with (8)). Since ≥ x < 1,
This always holds when there is a subsidy for bequests and tax on harvests regardless of the harvest tax rate, By and large, the policy mix most often used by governments in North America and Europe to raise revenues is a tax on both bequests and harvests. But the results here argue that such a mix may not be efficient. We will return to this issue in Section 3.
The Design of Policy Instruments
We now turn to the question of how the government should structure harvest and timber bequest policies to raise revenues and maximize social welfare. We do this under the relevant case that timber bequests are operative, i.e., allowing us to abstract from monetary bequests. As a precursor, in Appendix 2 we show how the effects of taxes on timber bequests and harvesting can be decomposed into income and substitution effects using the Slutsky equations. From now on we will refer to the compensated substitution effects of timber and bequest taxes on harvesting and bequests as respectively. As we demonstrate in the Appendix 2, We also assume that the government, when designing its policy, faces a binding revenue target, as is common. Moreover, if there is a free access to private forests and amenities are associated with the forest stock, then forest preservation and transfers across generations represent public goods that must be taken into account by the government when choosing policies. In the next two sections, we show formally how the choice of policies depends critically on the position of the economy relative to the golden rule steady state. The golden rule steady state is the one where consumption is maximized (See Blanchard and Fisher 1989, pp. 104-107) . Other possible steady states are defined based on over or under-accumulation of capital relative to the golden rule.
Optimal Policy Mix when Private Amenity Services are Private Goods
We start by examining the benevolent government's choice of policy instruments.
We will first assume that amenity services are private goods, i.e., that citizens (presumably recreators) do not have access to private forests and do not enjoy the corresponding amenity services.
Let the government's exogenous revenue target be denoted by G, which must be met in the steady state. Given that n is the growth rate of the population, the steady state revenue target can be derived by adding tax revenue collections over the two overlapping generations that are alive at any point in time.
where x and b denote steady state levels of harvesting and timber bequests, respectively.
Equation (11) 
The Lagrangian for the problem is ] ) 1 (
, where ↔ is the shadow price of government budget constraint, i.e., the marginal cost of public funds.
The first order condition for the optimal lump sum tax, T is,
Equation (13a) implies that the government sets the lump sum tax rate so that the marginal welfare loss (first RHS term) equals the marginal cost of collecting revenue from the tax (second RHS bracketed term).
Obviously, the revenue collection effect depends on population growth rates, timber prices across generations, as well as the response of timber bequests and harvesting to the lump sum tax (b T and X T ). The remaining first-order conditions for the bequest and harvest policies are, respectively, 
Using (14), we can now obtain expressions for the optimal harvest and timber bequest policies by solving the problem in (14),
It can be shown that the denominators of the equations (15a-15b) are positive due to properties of the Slutsky equations for this problem (see Appendix 3).
Interpreting these results requires that we consider three cases; one where the economy resides at the golden rule and consumption per capita is maximized (r = n); one where the economy resides in a dynamically inefficient steady state (r<n) and there is an over-investment of capital; and one where the economy resides in a dynamically efficient steady state (r>n) and there is an under-investment of capital.
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In addition, we will make use of Proposition 1 concerning operative bequests. 8 The distinction of dynamic efficiency and inefficiency simply relates to whether the economy is growing faster or slower than the rate of interest. The golden rule, using the terminology of Phelps (1961) , is where these rates equate. This gives the highest rate of consumption and capital
The Golden Rule
The golden rule level of forest capital (and hence bequests) occurs in the steady state only if the interest rate equals the growth rate of the population, i.e., when r = n. In this case, the economy is termed "dynamically efficient," and therefore ⁄ in (15a) and (15b) equal zero (recall ⁄ = - (1/(1+n) -1/(1+r))x) . This implies that 
Dynamic Inefficiency
When the economy is dynamically inefficient and timber bequests are operative (see Proposition 1), we have n r Ψ so that 0 [ ⁄ . Now, notice from (15a) and (15b) that the optimal policy mix will require nonzero bequest and harvest policies. Specifically, using the results from Appendix 2 that compensated substitution effects are negative, , and recalling that the numerator of (15a)-(15b) is always positive, it is clear that the government should issue a subsidy for forest harvesting ≥ x < 0 combined with a tax on forest bequests, ≥ b > 0. Intuitively, when the economy is inefficient there is an overinvestment of capital in the long run. In the forestry case, this implies the steady state forest stock is too high. One way for the government to correct such an inefficiency is to subsidize the reduction of forest capital. Revenue shortfalls can be satisfied by taxing timber bequests. This dual purpose is achieved with the tax-subsidy mix.
According to Corollary 1 this combination, however, makes an operative timber bequest less likely.
Dynamic Efficiency
Finally, for the case of dynamic efficiency ( n r [ ), ⁄ < 0, the optimal tax-subsidy mix is reversed. By taxing harvesting and subsidizing timber bequests the government stock (see also Blanchard and Fisher 1989, pp. 102-103). can move the economy closer to the golden rule according to (15a) and (15b). Further, by Corollary 1, this instrument mix also reinforces the condition for operative timber bequests, making them more likely. Because the steady state forest stock is too low, harvest taxes and bequest subsidies encourage intergenerational transfers and long run investments in forests. Summarizing and assuming that the timber bequest is operative in the dynamically inefficient economy, we have
Proposition 2. (Amenity services are private goods) If the economy is at the golden rule (r=n), the lump sum tax is sufficient to collect revenues and distortionary instruments should not be used; If the economy is dynamically inefficient (r<n), the optimal policy mix includes also a subsidy on harvesting and a tax on timber bequests; if the economy is dynamically efficient (r>n), the optimal policy mix includes a subsidy on timber bequests and a tax on harvesting.
Proposition 2 represents a departure from the general economics literature, where it has been argued that capital taxes must always be optimally equal to zero in the steady state of overlapping generations economies. But our results establish that (timber) capital taxes may indeed be optimal for the forestry case. The proposition has practical importance as well. For forest policy design, it is critical to know where the economy resides relative to the golden rule, as the signs of the bequest and harvest taxes will reverse if the economy moves from a dynamically inefficient to an efficient equilibrium.
Hence, attaining a social welfare optimum in a forest economy may require either to subsidizing or taxing bequests or taxing or subsidizing timber harvests. Generally, though, some type of subsidy will always be optimal.
Let us consider, finally, what happens if the timber bequest is not operative and the economy is dynamically inefficient (see Corrollary 1). It is straightforward to
establish that, in addition to the lump sum tax, the government should now levy a subsidy on harvesting (see Appendix 3, eqns A3.2a and A3.2c and A3.2b). Hence, we have
Corollary 2. If the timber bequest is inoperative in the dynamically inefficient economy, the optimal tax policy is a combination of a lump sum tax and a subsidy on harvesting.
The intuition behind Corollary 2 follows along the same lines as above. The government has no need to subsidize timber bequests because they are no longer operative.
Optimal Policy Mix when Amenity Services are Public Goods
We now turn to the case where amenity services from unharvested timber stocks are not only a private good, but also a public good in the sense that non-landowner citizens (i.e., recreators) have access to enter private forestlands and enjoy amenities from forest stocks. These amenities could include those obtained through direct access to private forests, or those such as non-use values unrelated to access associated with forests by non-landowners, such as airshed and watershed protection as well as habitat for various species. In either case, this is an interesting and important extension because it is most relevant in practice.
In this case the government must account for how conservation of the timber stock, through bequests, brings utility to recreators in both current and future generations.
A classical Pigouvian externality exists if one generation makes decisions about harvesting and bequests not accounting for the benefit future generations and recreators receive from amenity services of forest stocks. Given that the marginal welfare effect of any policy is important to its application, it is reasonable to expect that these public goods will alter the optimal mix of policies and will change the distribution of bequests and forest stocks in the long run steady state equilibrium. We now investigate these issues.
As the government values public goods from forests, its policy problem is modified accordingly, The 'q-1' term reflects the fact that amenities are also present in V(.) from (1). We also assume Following a procedure similar to the one we used for deriving equation (15b) and (15c), we can solve for optimal policies assuming that the lump sum tax is set at its optimal level (denoted by a T ). Using the Slutsky decompositions, we then arrive at an expression for the modified optimal steady state timber harvesting policy (see Appendix
where the superscript 'a' refers to the public goods case. Recall that the superscript '* ' refers to the optimal policy level corresponding to the case where amenity services represent private goods (see eqns (15a) and (15b)).
By the same procedure we can obtain the optimal steady state bequest policy (see
Equations (17)- (18) imply that the optimal tax choice is now composed of the policy which solves the previous government's problem (first term on each RHS), plus a new additive "Pigouvian" term (second term on each RHS).
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The Pigouvian term represents an adjustment that reflects public goods lost through harvesting of the steady state forest stock. This term ensures that the efficient level of public goods (timber stock) is achieved in the long run and that the government also achieves its binding revenue target.
12 without loss that the number of recreators increases at the same rate as the population of landowners. 11 The additive form of the solution is similar to what Sandmo (1975) found for optimal taxes in the presence of externalities.
Golden Rule
The presence of the Pigouvian adjustment in (17) - (18) (17) and (18) . In this case the government corrects the externality via the Pigouvian adjustment, but raises revenues using the lump sum tax. Thus,
Proposition 3. (Amenity services are public goods)
If the economy resides at the golden rule, then the lump sum tax is no longer sufficient for optimal policy. In addition to the lump sum tax, the optimal policy mix includes a subsidy on timber bequests and tax on harvesting.
In the previous case without public goods accruing to the forest stock (Proposition 2), if the economy was already at the golden rule steady state, optimal harvest and bequest policies equaled zero and all revenue was to be raised with nondistortionary lump sum taxes. However, when public goods are lost from harvesting timber, the government should employ both lump sum and distortional instruments. This result is another case where capital taxes, in the form of timber, are optimally positive in the long run, even though the capital stock equates with its golden rule level. In contrast to the standard economics literature, our new result occurs because overaccumulation of forest capital relative to the golden rule might actually be efficient if public goods are conserved from the stock.
Dynamic Efficiency
Consider the opposing case of dynamic inefficiency, where r < n. Here, there is an overinvestment of capital in the long run, so that in a forestry context the long run forest stock is too high. From Section 3 we know 0 [
when r < n and amenities are not public goods. These policies were required to decrease the forest stock, which is too high from Society's viewpoint.
The new Pigouvian components in equation (17) and (18) reverse this previous result, so that a harvest subsidy and bequest tax are efficient. The different policy mix with public goods allows the economy to adjust toward a higher level of forest stock and public goods, given that there is utility obtained from existence of preserved forest stock.
Hence, when amenity services are public goods and the government responds to these, the government might behave differently and the efficient policy mix might be different than the one described in Proposition 2.
Dynamic Inefficiency
Finally, for the case where the economy is dynamically efficient in the sense that r > n, recall the optimal policy choice is a subsidy on bequests and tax on harvests,
. From (17) and (18) 
≥
.This serves to increase the long run forest stock and correct the equilibrium underinvestment of capital. Now, the revenue collection and externality correction aspects of the policy instruments reinforce each other. We can summarize these observations in:
Proposition 4. (Amenity services are a public good)
In the dynamically inefficient economy, the optimal policy mix for harvesting and timber bequests is a priori ambiguous, while in the dynamically efficient economy the optimal policy mix includes a subsidy on timber bequests and tax on harvesting.
Optimal Policies and Rent Seeking
The assumptions concerning government preferences towards agents in the economy and revenue collection might be important to the results above. Thus far we have assumed that the government acts as a benevolent maximizer of landowners' and citizens' welfare subject to the revenue target. In many cases, though, governments have been criticized for seeking to maximize revenue collections. Such a government in our model would choose policies to maximize its tax collections without regard to the distortions in public and private goods that would accompany such behavior. The question now becomes: how does such behavior effect the optimal long run policy mix?
A government seeking to maximize revenue has been called a Leviathan government in the public choice literature. The Leviathan government's policy problem for our problem is written,
We can show two results with such an objective.
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First, the lump sum tax will be set at a higher level compared to the case where the government does not maximize revenue collections, i.e.,
. This is because the government does not care about the negative welfare effect of higher taxes, given by 
where ⁄ is defined as before. Hence, the Leviathan government ends up with qualitatively similar policies as the benevolent government does when amenities are private goods.
The only difference is that the levels of taxes and subsidies are higher. 14 Proposition 5. If the government is Leviathan in that it seeks to maximize revenue collections, the optimal structure of policy instruments is equivalent to the benevolent government case when amenity services are private goods, but all taxes and subsidies are higher.
A full set of result is available from the authors upon request. 14 The qualifications of Proposition 5 for the case of inoperative timber bequest motives remain If public goods are present and the government maximizes revenues, the optimal bequest and harvest policies will continue to be given by (20a) and (20b). This is because in this case the government ignores the positive welfare effect of forest stocks on future generations. As a result, for a Leviathan government there is no longer a distinction between policy instruments that depends on amenities.
An Extension: Optimal Policy Mix in a Small Open Economy with a Production Sector
Our previous model assumed that prices in the economy were exogenous. While this makes sense from the landowner's perspective, this may not be reasonable as far as the government's policy choices are concerned. We therefore now consider a general equilibrium setting where output is produced using two inputs, non-resource capital t K and labor t L , according to a neo-classical production function which exhibits a constant returns to scale. Capital and labor in this context comes from the savings of representative landowners in each generation and labor supplied, respectively. We will show that our previous results can be generalized to the case of a small open economy.
Using the CRS assumption, we can write production as
is per capita non-resource capital and
In each period, we assume conventionally that firms comprising the production sector act competitively and that non-resource capital depreciates fully. Incorporating this depreciation, we will have after one period
the same as given in Corollary 2.
According to (21a) and (21b), the marginal product of labor is equal to the wage rate t w , and the marginal product of capital is equal to the interest rate 
The steady state equilibrium can be described in terms of the economy's savings, bequests, external debt, and current and trade account deficits as follows (22) s k e ϑ Ζ , ne q Ζ and e r n b ) ( ϑ Ζ Now consider how these revisions affect our previous results. Assuming that amenity services are private goods we can reproduce proposition 2 without any difficulty.
Using (22) it is also easy to see that at the golden rule ) ( n r Ζ , provided that consumption is a normal good, the lump sum tax presented earlier would simply increase the steady state value of foreign debt and current account deficit, but it would have no effect on the 15 Weil (1987) (p. 384-388) has shown how the conditions for operative bequests developed earlier can be generalized to cover the case of production economies and Thibault (2000) has shown the conditions for the existence of a nontrivial steady state equilibrium in the OLG model with production and altruistic agents in a closed economy framework which incorporates capital market equilibrium. Vidal (2000) has analyzed the welfare effects of capital mobility in a two-country model with altruistic preferences. 16 It is worth noting that this would occur with internationally mobile capital only if countries are identical in all respects. 17 See Persson (1985) [ , where we would find that the optimal policy mix involves tax on harvesting and a subsidy on timber bequests. Analogously, the optimal policy mixes presented in Propositions 3 -5 continue to hold in the case of small open economies with production sectors.
Conclusions
In this paper we studied the optimal design of forest policies in an overlapping generation economy with intergenerational transfers. We allow for amenity services of forest stocks to exist as either private or public goods depending on whether citizens have access to private forests or not. The government is initially assumed to behave like a benevolent planner which maximizes social welfare subject to revenues and the behavior of generations. But we relax this to study the rent seeking Leviathan government, which tries to maximize its tax revenue and neglects welfare impacts. Allowing for a production sector does not affect the results we derive as long as the economy is assumed to be small and facing world output prices and interest rates.
Our results extend the existing literature on bequests by first demonstrating that timber bequests can dominate money bequests under a variety of situations. Unlike money bequests, timber bequests can be operative even in dynamically inefficient steady states. We also show that a combination of harvest taxes and timber bequest subsidies further reinforces the condition for operative timber bequests. However, a combination of harvest subsidies and timber taxes makes timber bequests less likely in the long run. If timber bequests are not operative in a dynamically inefficient economy, then the optimal policy mix is a combination of a lump sum tax and subsidy on harvesting. However, when timber bequests are operative, then given the optimal lump-sum tax, the optimal tax-subsidy mix between harvesting and timber bequests depends on both the nature of When forest amenities are private goods and the economy resides at the golden rule, only a lump sum tax suffices. In dynamically efficient economy, the lump sum policy is complemented by a harvest tax and bequest subsidy, because the steady state forest stock is too low. In a dynamically inefficient economy a harvest subsidy and bequest tax becomes optimal. If amenity services are public goods due to access, then a bequest subsidy and harvest tax are needed, both in the golden rule and in the dynamically efficient economy, to raise the equilibrium forest stock to an efficient level.
However, the efficient policy mix is ambiguous if the economy is dynamically inefficient. Finally, if the government acts to maximize revenues, then the optimal policy mix will be qualitatively similar to that of benevolent government in the absence of public goods, but the tax and subsidy rates will be higher.
These results offer several practical policy implications. For most governments, which have the dual purpose of raising revenue and providing public goods, our work suggests that policies targeting harvesting should not be adopted without simultaneous consideration of policies targeting bequests within the forest sector. Yet in practice and in the literature these policies are often analyzed in isolation. Moreover, one seldom finds subsidies for timber bequests in practice. Rather the usual case is for governments (at least in North America and Europe) to impose taxes on both timber harvesting and bequests. We demonstrated that there is no case where such a policy mix is an efficient means to raise revenue and provide public forest goods, for a variety of equilibria.
The policy design issues we address are not discussed in the current debate on sustainability. But our results suggest they should be part of this debate, at least for economies with altruistic motives. Failure to consider bequest and timber policy instruments jointly, and failure to predict the impacts of constraints governments face in applying them, will lead to potentially inefficient distributions of timber stocks in the long run. This in turn will lead to inefficient distributions of public goods in the long run.
In any case, the usual practice of taxing without accompanying subsidization, or vice versa, will not work.
Equations A1.2 and A1.3 represent the value of consumption over both periods of life for a landowner in the first and second generation, respectively. The first-order condition for money bequest (7d) can be rewritten In the steady state r r Ζ , and this gives equation (8) The precise formulas are available from the authors upon request. 
